datavow.com - Documents

1) Introduction
- 1) Purpose
- 2) Requirements
- 3) Terminology
- 4) Overall Operation
2) Notational Conventions and Generic Grammar
- 1) Augmented BNF
- 2) Basic Rules
3) Protocol Parameters
- 1) HTTP Version
- 2) Uniform Resource Identifiers
- 3) Date/Time Formats
  - 1) Full Date
  - 2) Delta Seconds
- 4) Character Sets
  - 1) Missing Charset
- 5) Content Codings
- 6) Transfer Codings
  - 1) Chunked Transfer Coding
- 7) Media Types
  - 1) Canonicalization and Text Defaults
  - 2) Multipart Types
- 8) Product Tokens
- 9) Quality Values
- 10) Language Tags
- 11) Entity Tags
- 12) Range Units
4) HTTP Message
- 1) Message Types
- 2) Message Headers
- 3) Message Body
- 4) Message Length
- 5) General Header Fields
5) Request
- 1) Request-Line
  - 1) Method
  - 2) Request-URI
- 2) The Resource Identified by a Request
- 3) Request Header Fields
6) Response
- 1) Status-Line
  - 1) Status Code and Reason Phrase
- 2) Response Header Fields
7) Entity
- 1) Entity Header Fields
- 2) Entity Body
  - 1) Type
  - 2) Entity Length
8) Connections
- 1) Persistent Connections
- 2) Message Transmission Requirements
9) Method Definitions
- 1) Safe and Idempotent Methods
  - 1) Safe Methods
  - 2) Idempotent Methods
- 2) OPTIONS
- 3) GET
- 4) HEAD
- 5) POST
- 6) PUT
- 7) DELETE
- 8) TRACE
- 9) CONNECT
10) Status Code Definitions
- 1) Informational 1xx
  - 1) Continue
  - 2) Switching Protocols
- 2) Successful 2xx
- 3) Redirection 3xx
- 4) Client Error 4xx
- 5) Server Error 5xx
11) Access Authentication
12) Content Negotiation
- 1) Server-driven Negotiation
- 2) Agent-driven Negotiation
- 3) Transparent Negotiation
13) Caching in HTTP
- 1) ..
- 2) Expiration Model
- 3) Validation Model
- 4) Response Cacheability
- 5) Constructing Responses From Caches
- 6) Caching Negotiated Responses
- 7) Shared and Non-Shared Caches
- 8) Errors or Incomplete Response Cache Behavior
- 9) Side Effects of GET and HEAD
- 10) Invalidation After Updates or Deletions
- 11) Write-Through Mandatory
- 12) Cache Replacement
- 13) History Lists
14) Header Field Definitions
- 1) Accept
- 2) Accept-Charset
- 3) Accept-Encoding
- 4) Accept-Language
- 5) Accept-Ranges
- 6) Age
- 7) Allow
- 8) Authorization
- 9) Cache-Control
  - 1) What is Cacheable
  - 2) What May be Stored by Caches
  - 3) Modifications of the Basic Expiration Mechanism
  - 4) Cache Revalidation and Reload Controls
  - 5) No-Transform Directive
  - 6) Cache Control Extensions
- 10) Connection
- 11) Content-Encoding
- 12) Content-Language
- 13) Content-Length
- 14) Content-Location
- 15) Content-MD5
- 16) Content-Range
- 17) Content-Type
- 18) Date
  - 1) Clockless Origin Server Operation
- 19) ETag
- 20) Expect
- 21) Expires
- 22) From
- 23) Host
- 24) If-Match
- 25) If-Modified-Since
- 26) If-None-Match
- 27) If-Range
- 28) If-Unmodified-Since
- 29) Last-Modified
- 30) Location
- 31) Max-Forwards
- 32) Pragma
- 33) Proxy-Authenticate
- 34) Proxy-Authorization
- 35) Range
  - 1) Byte Ranges
  - 2) Range Retrieval Requests
- 36) Referer
- 37) Retry-After
- 38) Server
- 39) TE
- 40) Trailer
- 41) Transfer-Encoding
- 42) Upgrade
- 43) User-Agent
- 44) Vary
- 45) Via
- 46) Warning
- 47) WWW-Authenticate
15) Security Considerations
- 1) Personal Information
- 2) Attacks Based On File and Path Names
- 3) DNS Spoofing
- 4) Location Headers and Spoofing
- 5) Content-Disposition Issues
- 6) Authentication Credentials and Idle Clients
- 7) Proxies and Caching
  - 1) Denial of Service Attacks on Proxies
16) Acknowledgments
17) References
18) Authors' Addresses
19) Appendices
- 1) Internet Media Type message/http and application/http
- 2) Internet Media Type multipart/byteranges
- 3) Tolerant Applications
- 4) Differences Between HTTP Entities and RFC 2045 Entities
- 5) Additional Features
  - 1) Content-Disposition
- 6) Compatibility with Previous Versions
20) Index
21) Full Copyright Statement
22) Acknowledgement

15.1 Personal Information

HTTP clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information (e.g. the user's name, location, mail address, passwords, encryption keys, etc.), and SHOULD be very careful to prevent unintentional leakage of this information via the HTTP protocol to other sources. We very strongly recommend that a convenient interface be provided for the user to control dissemination of such information, and that designers and implementors be particularly careful in this area. History shows that errors in this area often create serious security and/or privacy problems and generate highly adverse publicity for the implementor's company.

15.1.1 Abuse of Server Log Information

A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's requests which might identify their reading patterns or subjects of interest. This information is clearly confidential in nature and its handling can be constrained by law in certain countries. People using the HTTP protocol to provide data are responsible for ensuring that such material is not distributed without the permission of any individuals that are identifiable by the published results.

15.1.2 Transfer of Sensitive Information

Like any generic data transfer protocol, HTTP cannot regulate the content of the data that is transferred, nor is there any a priori method of determining the sensitivity of any particular piece of information within the context of any given request. Therefore, applications SHOULD supply as much control over this information as possible to the provider of that information. Four header fields are worth special mention in this context: Server, Via, Referer and From.

Revealing the specific software version of the server might allow the server machine to become more vulnerable to attacks against software that is known to contain security holes. Implementors SHOULD make the Server header field a configurable option.

Proxies which serve as a portal through a network firewall SHOULD take special precautions regarding the transfer of header information that identifies the hosts behind the firewall. In particular, they SHOULD remove, or replace with sanitized versions, any Via fields generated behind the firewall.

The Referer header allows reading patterns to be studied and reverse links drawn. Although it can be very useful, its power can be abused if user details are not separated from the information contained in the Referer. Even when the personal information has been removed, the Referer header might indicate a private document's URI whose publication would be inappropriate.

The information sent in the From field might conflict with the user's privacy interests or their site's security policy, and hence it SHOULD NOT be transmitted without the user being able to disable, enable, and modify the contents of the field. The user MUST be able to set the contents of this field within a user preference or application defaults configuration.

We suggest, though do not require, that a convenient toggle interface be provided for the user to enable or disable the sending of From and Referer information.

The User-Agent (Section 14.43) or Server (Section 14.38) header fields can sometimes be used to determine that a specific client or server have a particular security hole which might be exploited. Unfortunately, this same information is often used for other valuable purposes for which HTTP currently has no better mechanism.

15.1.3 Encoding Sensitive Information in URI's

Because the source of a link might be private information or might reveal an otherwise private information source, it is strongly recommended that the user be able to select whether or not the Referer field is sent. For example, a browser client could have a toggle switch for browsing openly/anonymously, which would respectively enable/disable the sending of Referer and From information.

Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure) HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol.

Authors of services which use the HTTP protocol SHOULD NOT use GET based forms for the submission of sensitive data, because this will cause this data to be encoded in the Request-URI. Many existing servers, proxies, and user agents will log the request URI in some place where it might be visible to third parties. Servers can use POST-based form submission instead

15.1.4 Privacy Issues Connected to Accept Headers

Accept request-headers can reveal information about the user to all servers which are accessed. The Accept-Language header in particular can reveal information the user would consider to be of a private nature, because the understanding of particular languages is often strongly correlated to the membership of a particular ethnic group. User agents which offer the option to configure the contents of an Accept-Language header to be sent in every request are strongly encouraged to let the configuration process include a message which makes the user aware of the loss of privacy involved.

An approach that limits the loss of privacy would be for a user agent to omit the sending of Accept-Language headers by default, and to ask the user whether or not to start sending Accept-Language headers to a server if it detects, by looking for any Vary response-header fields generated by the server, that such sending could improve the quality of service.

Elaborate user-customized accept header fields sent in every request, in particular if these include quality values, can be used by servers as relatively reliable and long-lived user identifiers. Such user identifiers would allow content providers to do click-trail tracking, and would allow collaborating content providers to match cross-server click-trails or form submissions of individual users. Note that for many users not behind a proxy, the network address of the host running the user agent will also serve as a long-lived user identifier. In environments where proxies are used to enhance privacy, user agents ought to be conservative in offering accept header configuration options to end users. As an extreme privacy measure, proxies could filter the accept headers in relayed requests. General purpose user agents which provide a high degree of header configurability SHOULD warn users about the loss of privacy which can be involved.