datavow.com - Documents

1) Introduction
- 1) Purpose
- 2) Requirements
- 3) Terminology
- 4) Overall Operation
2) Notational Conventions and Generic Grammar
- 1) Augmented BNF
- 2) Basic Rules
3) Protocol Parameters
- 1) HTTP Version
- 2) Uniform Resource Identifiers
- 3) Date/Time Formats
  - 1) Full Date
  - 2) Delta Seconds
- 4) Character Sets
  - 1) Missing Charset
- 5) Content Codings
- 6) Transfer Codings
  - 1) Chunked Transfer Coding
- 7) Media Types
  - 1) Canonicalization and Text Defaults
  - 2) Multipart Types
- 8) Product Tokens
- 9) Quality Values
- 10) Language Tags
- 11) Entity Tags
- 12) Range Units
4) HTTP Message
- 1) Message Types
- 2) Message Headers
- 3) Message Body
- 4) Message Length
- 5) General Header Fields
5) Request
- 1) Request-Line
  - 1) Method
  - 2) Request-URI
- 2) The Resource Identified by a Request
- 3) Request Header Fields
6) Response
- 1) Status-Line
  - 1) Status Code and Reason Phrase
- 2) Response Header Fields
7) Entity
- 1) Entity Header Fields
- 2) Entity Body
  - 1) Type
  - 2) Entity Length
8) Connections
- 1) Persistent Connections
- 2) Message Transmission Requirements
9) Method Definitions
- 1) Safe and Idempotent Methods
  - 1) Safe Methods
  - 2) Idempotent Methods
- 2) OPTIONS
- 3) GET
- 4) HEAD
- 5) POST
- 6) PUT
- 7) DELETE
- 8) TRACE
- 9) CONNECT
10) Status Code Definitions
- 1) Informational 1xx
  - 1) Continue
  - 2) Switching Protocols
- 2) Successful 2xx
- 3) Redirection 3xx
- 4) Client Error 4xx
- 5) Server Error 5xx
11) Access Authentication
12) Content Negotiation
- 1) Server-driven Negotiation
- 2) Agent-driven Negotiation
- 3) Transparent Negotiation
13) Caching in HTTP
- 1) ..
- 2) Expiration Model
- 3) Validation Model
- 4) Response Cacheability
- 5) Constructing Responses From Caches
- 6) Caching Negotiated Responses
- 7) Shared and Non-Shared Caches
- 8) Errors or Incomplete Response Cache Behavior
- 9) Side Effects of GET and HEAD
- 10) Invalidation After Updates or Deletions
- 11) Write-Through Mandatory
- 12) Cache Replacement
- 13) History Lists
14) Header Field Definitions
- 1) Accept
- 2) Accept-Charset
- 3) Accept-Encoding
- 4) Accept-Language
- 5) Accept-Ranges
- 6) Age
- 7) Allow
- 8) Authorization
- 9) Cache-Control
  - 1) What is Cacheable
  - 2) What May be Stored by Caches
  - 3) Modifications of the Basic Expiration Mechanism
  - 4) Cache Revalidation and Reload Controls
  - 5) No-Transform Directive
  - 6) Cache Control Extensions
- 10) Connection
- 11) Content-Encoding
- 12) Content-Language
- 13) Content-Length
- 14) Content-Location
- 15) Content-MD5
- 16) Content-Range
- 17) Content-Type
- 18) Date
  - 1) Clockless Origin Server Operation
- 19) ETag
- 20) Expect
- 21) Expires
- 22) From
- 23) Host
- 24) If-Match
- 25) If-Modified-Since
- 26) If-None-Match
- 27) If-Range
- 28) If-Unmodified-Since
- 29) Last-Modified
- 30) Location
- 31) Max-Forwards
- 32) Pragma
- 33) Proxy-Authenticate
- 34) Proxy-Authorization
- 35) Range
  - 1) Byte Ranges
  - 2) Range Retrieval Requests
- 36) Referer
- 37) Retry-After
- 38) Server
- 39) TE
- 40) Trailer
- 41) Transfer-Encoding
- 42) Upgrade
- 43) User-Agent
- 44) Vary
- 45) Via
- 46) Warning
- 47) WWW-Authenticate
15) Security Considerations
- 1) Personal Information
- 2) Attacks Based On File and Path Names
- 3) DNS Spoofing
- 4) Location Headers and Spoofing
- 5) Content-Disposition Issues
- 6) Authentication Credentials and Idle Clients
- 7) Proxies and Caching
  - 1) Denial of Service Attacks on Proxies
16) Acknowledgments
17) References
18) Authors' Addresses
19) Appendices
- 1) Internet Media Type message/http and application/http
- 2) Internet Media Type multipart/byteranges
- 3) Tolerant Applications
- 4) Differences Between HTTP Entities and RFC 2045 Entities
- 5) Additional Features
  - 1) Content-Disposition
- 6) Compatibility with Previous Versions
20) Index
21) Full Copyright Statement
22) Acknowledgement

15.7 Proxies and Caching

By their very nature, HTTP proxies are men-in-the-middle, and represent an opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks. Compromise of the systems on which the proxies run can result in serious security and privacy problems. Proxies have access to security-related information, personal information about individual users and organizations, and proprietary information belonging to users and content providers. A compromised proxy, or a proxy implemented or configured without regard to security and privacy considerations, might be used in the commission of a wide range of potential attacks.

Proxy operators should protect the systems on which proxies run as they would protect any system that contains or transports sensitive information. In particular, log information gathered at proxies often contains highly sensitive personal information, and/or information about organizations. Log information should be carefully guarded, and appropriate guidelines for use developed and followed. (Section 15.1.1).

Caching proxies provide additional potential vulnerabilities, since the contents of the cache represent an attractive target for malicious exploitation. Because cache contents persist after an HTTP request is complete, an attack on the cache can reveal information long after a user believes that the information has been removed from the network. Therefore, cache contents should be protected as sensitive information.

Proxy implementors should consider the privacy and security implications of their design and coding decisions, and of the configuration options they provide to proxy operators (especially the default configuration).

Users of a proxy need to be aware that they are no trustworthier than the people who run the proxy; HTTP itself cannot solve this problem.

The judicious use of cryptography, when appropriate, may suffice to protect against a broad range of security and privacy attacks. Such cryptography is beyond the scope of the HTTP/1.1 specification.

15.7.1 Denial of Service Attacks on Proxies

They exist. They are hard to defend against. Research continues. Beware.